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FEELING AND THINKING LIKE A LAWYER:  
COGNITION, EMOTION, AND THE PRACTICE 
AND PROGRESS OF LAW 
Susan A. Bandes* 
 
Generations of lawyers have been taught that thinking like a lawyer 
requires putting emotion aside.  They are warned, for example, that anger 
will blind them to the facts as they really are.  Yet cognitive science rejects 
the notion that emotion and reason are autonomous, warring spheres.  
Recently there has been increasing recognition of the harmful consequences 
of the narrow conception of “thinking like a lawyer” for lawyers’ well-being, 
but these consequences are generally portrayed as a necessary trade-off 
between the well-being of lawyers and the preservation of analytical rigor.  
This Essay will argue that the harm the narrow conception of “thinking like 
a lawyer” poses to lawyers’ well-being is not simply an ancillary issue or an 
unfortunate but necessary collateral consequence of engaging in rigorous, 
logical thinking.  A conception of law that attempts to cordon off emotion is 
poorly suited to the complexities of legal practice and is inconsistent with 
modern knowledge about how legal, ethical, and moral reasoning—and 
indeed, legal change and reform—actually occur.  This Essay will focus in 
particular on the emotion of anger and the consequences of attempting to 
banish it from the realm of legal reasoning. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the first things I learned in law school was what belonged in my 
class notes, and what belonged in the margins.  When it was okay to say 
something out loud, and when to just scream silently in my heart.  One day 
not long into my first semester, we read a contracts case about a family whose 
home was displaced by strip mining.  The legal principle I dutifully wrote in 
my notes was that the family was only entitled to the market value rather than 
the replacement value of their property, a paltry $300 that was not close to 
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being sufficient to replace a home.1  I added an angry, slightly profane 
notation in the margin with an exclamation point, but I had already learned 
that my anger was marginalia—not only irrelevant to the analysis but a sign 
that I was letting my emotion interfere with my ability to think like a lawyer.2 
In the early days of law school, students are asked to open themselves to a 
new way of thinking.  Not just a supplementary set of tools but a superseding 
framework.  This new framework requires would-be lawyers to put aside 
certain ways of understanding the world, certain ideas of right and wrong, 
certain notions of relevant and irrelevant.  This feels disorienting, even 
dangerous.  In exchange for putting these ideas and notions aside, students 
are promised membership in a guild of rigorous thinkers with its own internal 
logic and guideposts.  In this Essay, I reexamine the arguments for relegating 
emotions to the margins and take stock of the costs of doing so.  The concerns 
I raise center on both the misguided notion of “putting aside” emotional 
responses and moral intuitions and on the promise that entry into a rigorous, 
coherent system of thought awaits those who succeed in splitting their 
emotions off from their legal analysis.  I will argue that a conception of law 
that treats emotion as antithetical to reason is poorly suited not only to the 
well-being of lawyers but also to the complexities of legal practice.  
Moreover, it is inconsistent with modern knowledge about how legal, ethical, 
and moral reasoning—and indeed, legal change and reform—actually occur. 
When judges and other legal decision makers use the terms “emotion” and 
“emotional,” it almost invariably augurs an adverse ruling or some other 
negative outcome.  In law, these terms are basically catchall pejoratives, a 
signal that an argument is prejudicial3 or transparently manipulative or that a 
witness is unreliable or incredible.  It is a conclusory dismissal rather than a 
reasoned basis for exclusion:  emotion is the opposite of reason and therefore 
should be avoided.4  What is lacking is any examination or explanation of 
what it is about emotion that is objectionable, prejudicial, or irrational. 
A more current and sophisticated view of emotion would permit nuanced 
and accurate debates about the role of various emotions in various contexts 
and about how to enhance the beneficial emotions and discourage those that 
are detrimental to good decision-making.  Across most of the disciplines that 
 
 1. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962) (finding that 
while the coal company breached its contract with the Peevyhouses, Garland did not have to 
fix the property or pay for the work necessary to restore the land (estimated at $29,000) but 
instead could just pay the Peevyhouses for the difference in land value (estimated at $300)). 
 2. See, e.g., Jennifer Mueller, How to Think Like a Lawyer, WIKIHOW (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.wikihow.com/Think-Like-a-Lawyer [https://perma.cc/JT68-5ZUU] (“Avoid 
emotional entanglement.  There’s a reason you might say you were ‘blinded’ by anger or 
another emotion—feelings aren’t rational and keep you from seeing facts that may be 
important to solving a problem.”). 
 3. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (explaining that “unfair 
prejudice . . . means an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, 
though not necessarily, an emotional one”); see also Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, 
Emotion, Proof and Prejudice:  The Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact 
Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1006 (2014). 
 4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (“Our task, of course, is to resolve the 
issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection.”). 
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study decision-making, there is a robust debate about emotion:  its definition, 
its dynamics, its regulation, and its appropriate roles.5  Like any term that 
attempts to encompass a complex set of internal phenomena, it can have no 
fixed, acontextual, cross-disciplinary definition.  But in brief, “[e]motions are 
part of the ‘stuff’ connecting human beings to each other and the world 
around them, like an unseen lens that colors all our thoughts, actions, 
perceptions, and judgments.”6  They are functions and processes that are part 
and parcel of our cognitive structure, for better or for worse.  As Jerome 
Kagan observes, our understanding of human behavior is hampered by the 
insistence on ascribing unitary meanings to terms that attempt to capture 
complex internal states7 and by the tendency to create oppositional categories 
that oversimplify and therefore obfuscate our understanding of human 
behavior.8  My concern is that the law’s caricatured and inaccurate opposition 
between thinking and feeling falls into precisely these traps, with highly 
problematic consequences. 
My instinct in first-year contracts to keep quiet about my anger and 
indignation was the product of norms I had already begun to imbibe.  The 
lesson was not only about the boundaries of allowable discourse but, more 
generally, about what counted as an allowable influence on judgment.  These 
norms are communicated and enforced in law school and in legal practice, 
both explicitly and implicitly.  And that is a problem for the health and well-
being of the members of our profession.  It is important to emphasize that 
this is not a question of trade-offs—rigorous legal analysis and attorney well-
being do not exist in opposition to each other.  The broad-brush 
marginalization of emotion (or what is perceived as “emotional”) is a 
problem for the path of the law too—as both a jurisprudential and a practical 
matter. 
The attempt to cordon off emotion from reason is detrimental to lawyering 
in the obvious sense that separating lawyers from their emotional reactions 
increases the risk of numbing them to their ethical intuitions.  In addition, the 
progress of law9 depends on giving voice to moral emotions.  The passion 
for justice is fueled by emotions like moral outrage.10  The point is 
emphatically not that emotion will tend to lead law in beneficial directions.  
Rather, it is that the failure to acknowledge and evaluate the emotions that 
 
 5. See, e.g., LISA FELDMAN BARRETT, HOW EMOTIONS ARE MADE:  THE SECRET LIFE OF 
THE BRAIN (2017); Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161 (2012). 
 6. Jeff Goodwin et al., Introduction to PASSIONATE POLITICS:  EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 1, 10 (Jeff Goodwin et al. eds., 2001). 
 7. JEROME KAGAN, WHAT IS EMOTION?:  HISTORY, MEASURES, AND MEANING 9 (2007). 
 8. Id. at 21–22. 
 9. This is not to say that there is some consensus view of justice or the progress of law.  
Acknowledging that emotion plays a role in decision-making does not obviate the need to 
debate which goals are desirable.  This was the central point of my article, Empathy, Narrative, 
and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996). 
 10. Goodwin et al., supra note 6, at 8 (“[I]njustice is most closely associated with ‘the 
righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul.’” (quoting WILLIAM A. GAMSOM, 
TALKING POLITICS 32 (1992))). 
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inevitably shape our perceptions, reactions, and decisions deprives us of 
essential knowledge, leaves us vulnerable to unexamined passions, and 
hampers our ability to reform legal institutions in light of the fullest, most 
accurate knowledge available. 
I.  WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT EMOTION 
A.  Definitions 
It is important at the outset to define some terms.  The emerging consensus 
among scientists and social scientists studying cognition is that emotion and 
reason are not oppositional categories.  In fact, it is fair to question whether 
“emotion” is even a useful category for those seeking to describe the 
components of decision-making.  It is more accurate to view cognition as a 
set of processes, many of which recruit emotion.11  These processes include 
highlighting salience, discerning patterns, shifting perspective to see 
otherwise invisible patterns, determining what remains in memory, weighing 
risks, and prioritizing certain actions over others.  They are distributed 
throughout the brain—there is no “emotion center” in which they reside.  In 
common usage, that is, these are all cognitive tasks, but none of them are 
purely “logical” or “rational” if those terms are defined to exclude emotion. 
But to evaluate the effects of the reason/emotion split on legal reasoning 
and legal practice requires more than just correcting misconceptions about 
how emotion works.  It requires an examination of the inaccurate ways in 
which the category emotion is deployed in the legal realm.  The outcome of 
the supposed splitting off of emotion from reason is not to banish emotion 
from the law school classroom or the halls of justice but to privilege certain 
emotions, certain conceptions of rationality, and certain emotion cultures 
over others.  The law school classroom, the practice of law, and jurisprudence 
are in fact rife with emotion—emotions, however, that are such a familiar 
part of the landscape they are perceived as rational.  For example, empathy 
is usually selective—it is hard to take a view from nowhere.12  But empathy 
for powerful parties is perceived as neutral and natural.  Empathy for the 
marginalized, on the other hand, is coded as soft, feminine, and suspect, and 
it is only this sort of empathy that is categorized as emotion.13  To take 
another example, anger may be viewed as irrational, out of control, and 
threatening, or it may be viewed as righteous—a sign of admirable 
willingness to defend the rule of law.  There is evidence that these differences 
are affected by the gender or race of the subject, among other variables.14  
 
 11. See generally LUIZ PESSOA, THE COGNITIVE-EMOTIONAL BRAIN:  FROM INTERACTIONS 
TO INTEGRATION (2013). 
 12. Bandes, supra note 9, at 375 n.60 (citing THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 
(1986)). 
 13. See Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 133, 135, 147 n.6 (discussing the confirmation process for Justice Sotomayor). 
 14. See, e.g., Mary L. Schuster & Amy Propen, Degrees of Emotion:  Judicial Responses 
to Victim Impact Statements, 6 J.L. CULTURE & HUMANS. 75 (2010); see also Susan A. Bandes, 
Share Your Grief but Not Your Anger:  Victims and the Expression of Emotion in Criminal 
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We cannot cordon emotion off from legal reasoning or legal practice even if 
we want to.  A better goal is to identify, articulate, and interrogate the whole 
range of emotions, including empathy, compassion, disgust, and moral 
outrage.  The problem is that once a stance is coded as emotional, we cease 
to attempt to evaluate it.15 
Moreover, the attempt to put emotion aside requires work that has 
tremendous psychic costs.  It takes work to create the appearance of 
disinterestedness and objectivity.  It takes work to project a tough exterior 
and a sense of unwavering certitude.  And the distribution of this work falls 
unevenly based on race, gender, and other types of marginalized status.16  
Emotional reactions are experienced and evaluated through prisms that 
include the race, gender, and ethnicity of both the subject and the object of 
evaluation.  Whose reactions are coded as righteous indignation and whose 
are coded as irrational fury?  Who is allowed to express anger?  Whose anger 
is likely to be dismissed as nonobjective and self-interested?17  Who has the 
luxury of viewing moral outrage as an abstract, optional vantage point rather 
than experiencing it as integral to one’s status and world view?18  These are 
issues that can be studied and problems that can be addressed, but first they 
must be acknowledged. 
B.  The Sociology of Emotion 
Sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild, in her influential work on the 
sociology of emotion, explained the notion of “emotion cultures”—
 
Justice, in THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION:  PHILOSOPHICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 263 (Catharine Abell & Joel Smith eds., 2016). 
 15. Jamal Greene refers to “an unexamined ambivalence toward the appropriate role of 
emotion in constitutional discourse,” arguing that the appeal to emotion in judicial opinions is 
quite pervasive and that we need a more precise and nuanced taxonomy for separating the 
good uses of emotion from the bad. Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2013). 
 16. See generally MEERA E. DEO, UNEQUAL PROFESSION:  RACE AND GENDER IN LEGAL 
ACADEMIA (2019). 
 17. See, e.g., Jessica M. Salerno et al., Women and African Americans Are Less Influential 
When They Express Anger During Group Decision Making, 22 GRP. PROCESSES & 
INTERGROUP RELS. 57 (2017).  In a mock jury study regarding holdout jurors, people perceived 
all holdouts expressing anger as more emotional than holdouts who expressed identical 
arguments without anger. See id.  Yet holdouts who expressed anger (versus no anger) were 
less effective and influential when they were women (but not men) or Black (but not white)—
despite having expressed identical arguments and anger. See id.  Although anger expression 
made participants perceive the holdouts as more emotional regardless of race and gender, 
being perceived as more emotional was selectively used to discredit Black and female jurors. 
See id.; see also REBECCA TRAISTER, GOOD AND MAD:  THE REVOLUTIONARY POWER OF 
WOMEN’S ANGER (2018). 
 18. See, e.g., Shaun Ossei-Owusu, For Minority Law Students, Learning the Law Can Be 
Intellectually Violent, ABA J. (Oct. 15, 2020, 11:23 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/voice 
/article/for_minority_law_students_learning_the_law_can_be_intellectually_violent 
[https://perma.cc/P8FA-V55Q] (“For many of you who have personally been subject to racial 
discrimination, the devaluation of minority lives is nothing new.  Those experiences alerted 
you to the law’s inability to mete out our visceral ideas about justice.  The difference, though, 
is that such injustice confronts you at a time when your training demands—and rewards—an 
emotionally desensitized all-sides-matter approach to law.”). 
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communities or institutions bound by shared rules about what we ought to 
feel and how and when we ought to express those feelings.19  Emotion 
cultures are perpetuated by rules about what emotions can and cannot be 
expressed, called “display rules.”20  More ominously, emotion cultures are 
also perpetuated by “feeling rules” about what emotions we ought to feel in 
given situations.21  Hochschild introduced the concept of “deep acting.”22  
She wrote, by way of example, about the insistence that flight attendants not 
only express a cheerful outward demeanor but also cultivate cheerful inner 
selves to match.23  Failure to feel appropriately could lead to ostracization 
and adverse career consequences.  Feeling and display rules may be implicit 
or explicit, but they are enforced.  Those who transgress them suffer 
consequences. 
Professional schools are obvious settings for communicating emotion rules 
and creating emotion cultures.  Take the example of medical school 
pedagogy—specifically, the well-known acculturation ceremony around the 
dissection of the cadaver.  Students once learned to crack dark jokes that 
dehumanize the body and create distance between the students and future 
patients whose illnesses and deaths they will need to learn to confront.24  
Medical schools have recently sought to change the emotion culture of the 
classroom—including taking specific steps to train doctors in empathy.25  
The emblematic encounter with the cadaver has changed.  Students at some 
schools now learn about the life of the deceased, meet the deceased’s family, 
and even engage in a ceremony of thanks.26 
Law schools, law firms, and other legal institutions create emotion 
cultures.  Despite some cultural differences, there is a distinct and widely 
shared ideology that permeates these institutions:  the ideology of thinking 
like a lawyer.  The critique of this goal is not new.  The low-hanging fruit is 
the Professor Kingsfield caricature—the gruff professor who informs 
students that he will transform their “skull[s] full of mush” into brains 
capable of lawyer-like thinking.27  This was actually not a caricature when I 
entered law school in 1973, by the way, but few of us teach that way today.  
We are kinder, we are gentler, we are modified Socratic.  But as one who was 
determined not to replicate Kingsfield, I was nevertheless forcefully struck 
 
 19. See generally ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART:  
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (1983). 
 20. Id. at 60. 
 21. Id. at 56. 
 22. Id. at 33. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom:  Toward a New Legal Realist 
Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (2007) (“In the gross anatomy lab, cultural norms 
around reverence for the body and death are routinely violated, subtly pushing students to give 
up old attitudes and adopt new ones.”). 
 25. See, e.g., LESLIE JAMISON, THE EMPATHY EXAMS (2014) (recounting the author’s stint 
as an actor helping medical students learn how to exercise empathy). 
 26. See Lindsay Kalter, Compassion Begins with the Cadavers, AAMC (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/compassion-begins-cadavers [https://perma.cc/DBD7-
U8SR]. 
 27. THE PAPER CHASE (20th Century Studios 1973). 
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by the implications of law professor and anthropologist Elizabeth Mertz’s 
description of how we inculcate students into a particular version of 
deliberative reasoning28—more specifically, how we transmit and replicate 
certain hierarchies about what counts as deliberative reason, or proper 
thought, or an appropriate source of knowledge. 
Mertz visited a range of first-year classrooms—the schools were state and 
private; highly ranked and lower ranked; eastern, midwestern, and western.29  
The professors varied in gender and race.30  Despite these differences, all the 
professors she observed communicated and reinforced the same hierarchy.  
Professors across the board demonstrated a similar laser-like attention to 
detail on some issues and permission to generalize without systematic 
evidence on others.31  Mertz observed professors engaging in painstakingly 
close readings of the precise language of an opinion or a statute, filled with 
rigorous feedback.32  Then when it was time to move to a discussion of real-
world consequences via social scientific studies, for example, the tenor 
would change.33  The professor would signal a move to an open-ended 
discussion in which sources and interpretive moves did not need to be 
examined with precision and rigor.34  Relegated to that second basket were 
sources of authority that were viewed as subjective, fuzzy, and 
ungeneralizable, including not just the social sciences but ethics and 
morality.35  As Mertz observed, students trying to raise issues of morality did 
not get very far in classroom discussion.36  They were viewed as straying 
beyond the bounds of lawyer-like analysis. 
The most serious problem Mertz identifies is that law presents itself as an 
autonomous system.  The implicit hierarchy of sources of authority is taken 
for granted.  The message is that one should not reach beyond the approved 
sources to find a correct answer.  Like most totalized systems, jurisprudence 
fails to acknowledge that it is a system.  Unlike social scientists who learn 
the limits of their methodology, we lawyers are not generally trained to ask 
ourselves systematically what our method cannot do or to question or try to 
identify the limits of our approach.  In general, we are not trained to think of 
ourselves as engaging in methodology at all.  As a consequence, a student 
expressing indignation or moral outrage might be reined in or asked to 
 
 28. See Mertz, supra note 24, at 487; see also ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 
SCHOOL:  LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007).  It is certainly possible that first-year 
instruction has changed significantly in the interim, but I am aware of no studies revisiting 
this issue. 
 29. Mertz, supra note 24, at 488. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 495–96. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Senthorun Raj, Teaching Feeling:  Bringing Emotion into the Law School, 54 LAW 
TCHR. 1, 4 (2020) (citing Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy:  A 
Polemic Against the System, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:  A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54 (David 
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998)). 
 36. Mertz, supra note 24, at 508. 
2434 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
reframe her objection in legal language, using legal sources.  Her sense of 
outrage is framed (and even shamed) as untutored, perhaps naïve.  In this 
way, a lesson is communicated about hierarchies of knowledge—but not a 
very useful lesson.  In fact, there are conversations to be had about the role 
of morality in law (which legal philosophers do engage in) and about the role 
of emotion in law (which legal philosophers are much less likely to engage 
in).37  There are conversations to be had about the limits of our field and our 
expertise.  But emotion is not approached as a possible source of knowledge 
to evaluate—just as a bad habit to break. 
II.  THE COMPONENTS OF LEGAL REASONING 
Legal education is first and foremost concerned with identifying principled 
reasons for judgment and separating them out from the irrelevant, the 
prejudicial, and the unprincipled.  Yet these terms are not self-defining.  As 
the philosopher Mark Johnson explains:  any notion of rationality is 
evaluative through and through, and the values it privileges are chosen and 
contingent, not built into the essential structure of rationality.38  What counts 
as an appropriate justification, a good reason, or a good method of reasoning 
will depend on the goals of the process.39 
In the legal realm, the ultimate goal of the process is to create, safeguard, 
and reform a complex system for predicting, channeling, and modeling 
human behavior, where the consequences for the participants may include 
loss of property, liberty, or life.  The debate about how to best achieve this 
goal is not a rarified discussion about the beauty and symmetry of abstract 
propositions.  Entrée into the debate is likely to arise from moral intuitions 
that grow from our own experiences and take shape in the social world.  It 
requires sifting through the mass of information that bombards us to discern 
relevant features and patterns.  Emotions help us understand relevance from 
various vantage points, discern patterns of relevant information, and flag 
what is important and worthy of attention. 
In short, emotions are an essential component of the reasoning process.  To 
be clear about what I mean by “essential,” let me begin by contrasting my 
argument with the conception of emotion embedded in the field of behavioral 
law and economics.40  This field purports to acknowledge and incorporate 
the vagaries of human behavior, but it persists in casting influences like 
emotion as quick and dirty shortcuts.  That is, at best, emotion is a poor 
substitute for slow, deliberative, “rational” thinking.41  At worst, it is a detour 
 
 37. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010). 
 38. See MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION:  IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR 
ETHICS 227 (1993). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 41. The literature treats affect as a heuristic and a heuristic as a mental shortcut for a more 
careful evaluation. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, 177 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL 
RSCH. 1333 (2007).  The examples tend to involve problems with a quantifiably correct 
answer. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
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from it—a bias.42  It is never accorded its own epistemic value.  In 
comparison, the emerging consensus among affective scientists is that 
emotion has its own, freestanding epistemic importance—what legal theorist 
Maksymilan Del Mar calls “epistemic irreplaceability.”43  The information 
we glean from emotion cannot simply be replaced by other cognitive 
processes.  Our emotions give us unique, embodied access to key features of 
knowledge, including the vividness of certain information, its place in 
memory, and its action tendencies (its ability to motivate us to act or refrain 
from acting).  Judges can recruit their emotions to discern patterns and 
features they may otherwise miss,44 empathize with different parties, 
understand different points of view, and in doing so, perceive other legal 
frameworks.45  The progress of law is animated, in part, by perspective-
taking of a sort that is not merely cognitive.  As the political scientist Sharon 
R. Krause describes it, impartiality requires more than simply “understanding 
the concerns of others; it must also include appreciating, even being moved 
by, these concerns.”46  It requires affective engagement. 
Judges need to decide what characteristics of the parties and their 
situations are relevant from the standpoint of justice.47  Consider DeShaney 
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,48 in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected Joshua DeShaney’s claim that the state of Wisconsin 
violated a duty to protect him from harm.49  The use of emotive language in 
the opinions—and in particular Justice Harry Blackmun’s “poor Joshua!” 
exclamation50—attracted widespread attention.51  There is also some 
literature on the related but distinct question of how the emotions of the 
Justices may have shaped their factual perceptions and their framing of the 
legal issues.52  How can we best understand why Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist’s view of the salient facts was so different from Justice William 
Brennan’s?  Why did Chief Justice Rehnquist construe the relevant pattern 
as a series of excusable governmental failures to act, whereas Justices 
 
86 (2005) (comparing perceived and actual risks of nuclear power versus sunbathing).  For an 
in-depth discussion of this topic, see Susan A. Bandes, Emotions and Risk Regulation, 62 
STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 219, 227–29 (2013). 
 42. See Susan A. Bandes, Emotions, Values, and the Construction of Risk, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 421 (2008); see also Bandes, supra note 41, at 227–29. 
 43. MAKSYMILIAN DEL MAR, ARTEFACTS OF LEGAL INQUIRY:  THE VALUE OF IMAGINATION 
IN ADJUDICATION 161 (2020); see also Ann Laura Stoler, The Politics of “Gut Feelings”:  On 
Sentiment in Governance and the Law, 2 KNOW 207, 212 (2018) (“Emotions are not 
freestanding ‘things’ . . . but accretions of stored deliberation.”). 
 44. DEL MAR, supra note 43, at 160. 
 45. Id. 
 46. SHARON R. KRAUSE, CIVIL PASSIONS:  MORAL SENTIMENT AND DEMOCRATIC 
DELIBERATION 164 (2008). 
 47. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE:  EMPATHY IN LAW AND 
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Brennan and Blackmun saw a series of affirmative governmental actions that 
placed and kept Joshua in harm’s way?  Why was Chief Justice Rehnquist so 
cognizant of the harms of intervention and the burdens on the state of 
Wisconsin, whereas Justices Brennan and Blackmun were so cognizant of 
the harms to abused children when the government stands aside?53  This 
difference in interpretation of spacious guarantees like the Due Process 
Clause might flow from a myriad of sources.54  Justice Brennan himself, just 
a year prior to the DeShaney opinion, credited Justice Benjamin Cardozo 
with illuminating the process.  He noted that Justice Cardozo believed that 
judging could not properly be characterized as simply the application of 
pure reason to legal problems . . . [but] to a complex array of forces—
rational and emotional, conscious and unconscious—by which no judge 
could remain unaffected. . . .  [This] interplay of forces, this internal 
dialogue of reason and passion, does not taint the judicial process, but is in 
fact central to its vitality.55 
The philosopher Sabine Roeser argues that some emotions, such as 
sympathy, empathy, indignation, compassion, and enthusiasm, afford us a 
visceral awareness of threats to values like autonomy, justice, fairness, and 
equity.56  As I have argued, our visceral awareness of threats to security 
versus threats to autonomy is contextual and may shift over time in reaction 
to unfolding events.57  I will speculate that the public understanding of the 
notion of positive rights has changed since the nation has begun battling a 
pandemic.  The abstract principle on which the DeShaney opinion hinged—
that the government has no affirmative duty to safeguard the public health 
and welfare—was always controversial,58 but its stakes and consequences 
have become far less abstract in a post-COVID-19 world.  These public shifts 
have a way of animating jurisprudential shifts, as well.  For example, the 
judicial attitude toward the balance between security and autonomy 
noticeably shifted after the September 11, 2001, attacks.  Certain risks 
became more visceral while others receded.59  Emotion helps us decide what 
is important.  It moves us to action.  It helps us care about the consequences 
of our decisions.  The point is not that these emotions, by themselves, lead 
us to the correct legal answer.  Rather, they are an important species of 
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information.  For, as philosopher Rick Furtak argues, it is “only by feeling 
emotions that we are capable of recognising the value or significance of 
anything whatsoever.”60  Emotion’s exclusion from the ranks of principled 
sources cuts lawyers off from important wellsprings of information, 
identification, understanding, and morality.  As the neuroscientist Patricia 
Churchland observes:  “Morality does not and cannot emerge from pure logic 
alone.  It cannot be disengaged from our deep desires to care for others and 
for those with whom our welfare and prosperity are entwined.  It cannot be 
disengaged from our need to live social lives.”61 
Moreover, we will never truly set emotion aside even if we want to.  We 
simply embrace or redefine some emotions and stigmatize others in ways that 
are selective and that operate under the radar.  We ought to welcome the 
opportunity to understand it, evaluate it, and use the knowledge gleaned from 
it where appropriate. 
III.  ANGER, MORAL SHOCK, AND MORAL IMAGINATION 
Legal thought may be informed, or misinformed, by the whole range of 
emotions.  In this part, I will focus on three related emotions or emotional 
capacities that might influence legal analysis:  anger, moral shock, and moral 
imagination.  I choose these emotions, in part, to emphasize that the argument 
in favor of acknowledging emotion is not limited to the so-called “positive” 
emotions, and indeed the positive versus negative nomenclature is highly 
problematic.  The benefit of acknowledgement is that it permits fine-grained, 
contextual evaluation, including evaluation of how various emotions operate 
in particular legal contexts and whether they advance particular legal goals. 
A.  Anger 
Returning to my reaction to the contracts case,62 my anger, while certainly 
not dispositive to the case, or even framed in a way that deftly articulated a 
legal problem, was nevertheless information that could serve a valuable 
purpose.  The philosophical debate about the moral content and information 
value of anger dates back at least to Aristotle, who considered anger an 
“affective perception that points to and is animated by an offense.”63  More 
recently, philosopher Jesse Prinz observed that anger “may also be a 
necessary component of morality”64 and, more strongly, that “[w]e cannot 
relinquish anger without losing our moral sense.”65  The philosopher Agnes 
Callard similarly argues that anger at a wrong arises not only from our 
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cognizance of moral principles but from our attachment to those principles.66  
Our anger is evoked, not merely by the violation of neutral principles we 
admire and accept in the abstract, but by the understanding that 
transgressions against justice, fairness, and equality involve harm to real 
people.67  As political scientists Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper, and Francesca 
Polletta argue, a deprivation can be framed in various ways.68  For the target 
of the wrongful act, for example, it can be framed as a humiliation that evokes 
self-loathing and silence, or it can be framed as an injustice.69  Injustice 
frames a wrong in a way that reveals its systemic sources and inspires action.  
Professor Deborah Gould, writing about the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick70 on the fight against AIDS, reports that the 
decision caused a shift in the collective emotion culture “from quiet nobility 
to outrage and organized activism.”71 
Certainly, anger as an indicator of injustice can lead us astray—there can 
be no guarantee that the anger is normatively correct in its target.  Brittney 
Cooper, in her book celebrating the powerful role of “eloquent rage,” notes 
that not all such anger is righteous in nature.72  And it has long been 
controversial whether anger is the most functional response to wrongdoing.  
Martha Nussbaum has recently argued to the contrary, suggesting that anger 
too often short-circuits grief and otherwise harms those who harbor it.73  
These debates about the role of anger indicate that it is not a black box or a 
random collection of ephemeral impulses.  Anger, like any emotion, can be 
studied, and its role in various contexts can be debated.  There is, for 
example, substantial evidence about certain deleterious effects of anger on 
decision-making.  Anger moves people to action, but it does so in part by 
encouraging deliberative shortcuts.74  It would not be advisable to construct 
a deliberative regime that relies entirely on anger (or on any emotion in 
isolation, for that matter), but to study justice and injustice without 
acknowledging the role of anger is to miss an essential component of the 
dynamics of legal reform.  The anger a decision evokes is not, in itself, an 
argument.  In law, and indeed in a democratic society, the argument for 
change must ultimately be articulated in ways that all can understand and 
debate.75  But anger is a species of information, a signal that a transgression 
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may have occurred, a way to help understand and frame that information, and 
an impetus to respond to injustice. 
B.  Moral Shock 
In the wake of the events collectively known as “Ferguson,” the Journal 
of Legal Education published a symposium exploring Ferguson’s effects on 
legal teaching and scholarship.  As guest editor Marc Spindelman described 
in his introduction, the emotions of the moment were heightened and 
palpable: 
While the contributions . . . issue from a variety of perspectives, they all 
beat with a deep sense of tragedy about Ferguson, as well as a sense of 
urgency about the need for new ways of thinking about and teaching law—
in our scholarship, in our classrooms, and in our lives, as citizens—that is 
not business as usual.76 
In my own contribution to the volume, I described Ferguson as—for 
some77—a moral shock, 
the sense of outrage that occurs when an event or newly acquired 
information shows that the world is not what one had expected.  Moral 
shock combines the cognitive, moral, and emotional realms.  It includes “a 
visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea.”78 
Moral shock can engender feelings of dread and anger, and the way these 
feelings are understood and framed may be crucial to what comes next.  
“Dread can paralyze.  Anger, on the other hand, can be ‘transformed into 
moral indignation and outrage toward concrete policies and decision 
makers,’ and toward a rethinking of one’s moral principles.”79  I described 
the sense of pain and betrayal many of my students felt during that highly 
charged time as they came face-to-face with the limits of Fourth Amendment 
law and with the legal system’s inadequate response to the use of excessive 
force by law enforcement.  Confronting the limits of legal doctrine may 
induce vertigo in professors as well as students.  It takes us into a realm in 
which we are no longer in full control. 
In addition to helping students read closely and defend and articulate their 
arguments, we professors also “play an important role in modeling and 
channeling the ways in which our students express and manage their 
emotions—emotions that are closely intertwined with moral intuitions and 
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moral reasoning.”80  Our default reaction is often to “tamp down strong 
emotions or shift students to a purely cognitive realm”81 in which we are the 
recognized authorities.  At that moment, I was no longer the student silently 
raging at the teaching of a contracts case.  From my vantage point on the 
professor’s side of the podium, something else became clear:  “that the 
impulse to reassure my students that we can create intellectual order out of 
chaos is something I do for myself as much as for them.”82 
C.  Moral Imagination 
We acquire moral knowledge by switching between perspectives—the 
proverbial putting ourselves in one another’s shoes.  I have focused thus far 
on what are often called the “moral emotions”—the emotion of anger and its 
cousins, indignation and moral outrage, and the emotional capacity for 
empathy—arguing that these emotions and capacities, among others, are 
essential to a field whose goal is the attainment of justice.  Elsewhere I have 
also considered the role of emotions like compassion83 and love84 in the 
pursuit of justice.  In Part IV of this Essay, I will argue for an explicit link 
between our failure to acknowledge these emotions and capacities and the 
mental health problems that our profession confronts.  But first, to conclude 
this section, I will turn briefly to the question of epistemic emotions. 
Epistemic emotions—the emotions evoked by the process of learning—
ideally include curiosity, interest, enthusiasm, and wonder.85  These 
emotions have their own epistemic significance.  They “provide a richness of 
experience that cannot be substituted by a purely cognitive state.”86  For the 
professor, this is likely an uncontroversial proposition—it is a joy to teach a 
class animated by curiosity and enthusiasm.  But not all epistemic emotions 
are positive and uncontroversial—the category also includes anxiety and 
doubt.87  Ta-Nehisi Coates powerfully describes the epistemic role of anxiety 
when he recounts how it began to strike him during his college years that “the 
gnawing discomfort, the chaos, the intellectual vertigo” produced by his 
education was in fact the point of his education—that he should regard these 
emotions as “a beacon” rather than an alarm.88 
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The role of anxiety in legal education is fraught and complex.  The entire 
acculturation process, particularly in the first year, seems designed to evoke 
tremendous anxiety and vertigo by removing many of the guideposts students 
take for granted in exchange for the promise of initiation into a new epistemic 
and professional culture.  What is the appropriate role of anxiety in this new 
epistemic world?  I posit that it ought to be a kind of comfort with 
discomfort—an acceptance of indeterminacy.  Embracing indeterminacy is a 
necessary step toward mastering the richness, fluidity, and context 
dependence of law.  Yet it may be that the boundaries of the field of law 
allow certain kinds of indeterminacy and ward off others—those that 
interfere with the sense of control, authority, and hierarchy that characterize 
our field.  To put it another way, although legal analysis embraces a certain 
defined realm of indeterminacy, it strongly polices the boundaries of that 
realm to exclude anxieties that threaten its sense of internal coherence.  And 
many of those unwelcome anxieties have to do with emotion. 
In a critical response to Justice Brennan’s article on the role of passion in 
judging,89 legal scholar Owen Fiss stated that he could accept that “as much 
as [judges] strive to be rational, emotion and passion inevitably creep into the 
judicial process . . . [and] could be safely acknowledged, though on the 
understanding that [passion] must always be disciplined by reason.”90  What 
he could not accept was Justice Brennan’s suggestion that passion should 
enter the decisional process.91  Fiss’s language—the portrayal of emotion as 
stealthily “creep[ing],” the setting of the bounds of what we can “safely” 
acknowledge, the assumed need to “discipline[]” emotion—evokes a sense 
of anxiety at the threatened incursion of something untamed and 
undomesticated into an orderly world.92  To be clear, Fiss would firmly reject 
my characterization.  He regarded the turn to passion in the same way he 
regarded the turn to law and economics.  He viewed both as ill-fated attempts 
to reject indeterminacy—wrongheaded efforts to short-circuit the reasoning 
process in favor of certainty.93  His assumption was based on a particular 
view of emotions—he believed that resort to emotion circumvented the 
reasoning process because emotions are unanalyzable, subjective, and 
indeterminate in all the wrong ways.  Fiss also believed that the turn to 
passion was redundant—that any emotional reactions would need to be 
translated into reasons in any case and that the passions themselves had no 
independent epistemic value.94  These were and continue to be widely held 
views, but they are increasingly out of step with the scientific and social-
scientific consensus.  Emotions are educable and analyzable, they have 
independent epistemic validity, and they are inextricably intertwined with 
reasoning—both moral and legal.  Indeed, the passion for justice—and all the 
emotions that feed it, including moral outrage, moral shock, empathy, and 
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compassion—are prominent among the motivations that draw so many of us 
to the law and sustain us in the practice of law. 
IV.  THE MENTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF PUTTING EMOTION “ASIDE” 
Having argued for the value of keeping emotion in the classroom and the 
legal lexicon more generally, I now turn to the harms of banishing it.  More 
precisely, this part examines the harms of purporting to banish emotion, an 
exercise that has more to do with the way the categories emotion and reason 
are deployed than with actually creating an emotion-free system. 
In my seminar on law and emotion, one of the most poignant texts I teach 
is the chapter entitled “Not Talking,” from Susannah Sheffer’s moving 
ethnography about the emotional lives of capital defense attorneys.95  
Sheffer’s subjects specialize in post-conviction appeals and collateral review, 
and thus they are often the sole remaining hope for their clients on death row.  
Their job includes managing the hopes of their clients and clients’ family 
members and—too often—preparing their clients for the inevitability of 
execution and supporting family members in the aftermath.  They rise to 
these challenges on behalf of their clients time and time again, but they are 
not nearly as good at taking care of their own well-being.  In the chapter I 
teach, Sheffer’s subjects gradually open up about the internalized pressure to 
present themselves as hard-as-nails litigators who can absorb terrible losses 
with no need for emotional support.96  Often the attorneys would 
underestimate the pain their colleagues felt and would assume that their own 
pain was a sign of weakness or at least an individual problem that ought to 
be privately addressed.97 
A 2016 study released in the Journal of Addiction Medicine, conducted by 
the Hazelden Betty Ford Foundation and the American Bar Association 
Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs,98 in line with several previous 
studies,99 found that lawyers have the highest rate of major depressive 
disorder of any occupational group and among the highest rates of 
alcoholism.  The rates were significantly higher than those for doctors, 
despite the high stakes and grueling hours of the medical profession.100  One 
significant difference between the law and many other professions is the way 
the law, like the military and law enforcement, equates toughness with 
competence.  In these fields, asking for help is too often viewed as a sign of 
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weakness.  It can wreak havoc on reputations and careers.101  The military, 
recognizing that “silent suffering is taking a toll on military readiness,” has 
been fighting a “war on stigma” for years.  The legal system needs to do the 
same.102 
As I have argued elsewhere about the field of law, “there may be no other 
profession whose practitioners are required to deal with so much pain with 
so little support and guidance.”103  What is most pernicious about the plight 
of our profession is how thoroughly the aversion to emotional awareness is 
imbedded in our very self-conception: 
In the conventional view the very acknowledgement of our work’s 
emotional aspects—of the pain we cause, the pain we experience, the costs 
of the dissonance between role and conscience . . . seems at odds with law’s 
essence as a rational and rigorous discipline.  In short, acknowledging the 
role of emotion may brand one as not merely weak, but downright 
unlawyerlike.104 
The message that emotion must be set aside, that it is an interference with 
rigor and rationality, is conveyed early and often.  It robs us of information 
we need, both to practice law and to lead healthy, well-integrated lives.  At 
first glance, this may seem counterintuitive.  Certain defense mechanisms 
are, in certain respects, compatible with success in the law.  The Grant Study, 
an influential longitudinal study of the components of happiness in a group 
of Harvard men,105 contains fascinating data on the role of coping 
mechanisms in attaining work-life balance.106  The study found that certain 
coping mechanisms seemed, at first blush, well correlated with success in 
fields like the law that value detail-oriented, rational analysis.  In particular, 
subjects who used intellectualization (paying attention to external reality to 
avoid expression of inner feelings) and isolation (leaving the idea in 
consciousness but stripping it of all emotional affect) did well at pursuits, 
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like the law, that value this set of traits.107  As one standard work on 
psychoanalytic terms noted, these mechanisms may make thought “more 
efficient” by “avoiding the distraction associated emotions might cause.”108  
One might question whether “efficient thought” is a meaningful metric for 
success in the law, and certainly the legal profession has become gradually 
more cognizant of the role of empathy, emotional intelligence, cultural 
competence, conflict resolution skills, and facility at communication in the 
complex modern-day world of legal practice.109  But whatever the metric 
used for professional success, those who habitually use these coping 
mechanisms find themselves at risk for professional and personal distress and 
dysfunction.  The mechanisms prove hard to cabin.  Suppression that is 
adopted as a temporary coping strategy too frequently evolves into psychic 
numbing, repression, and denial of a more permanent sort.  George Valliant, 
one of the main authors of the Grant Study, found that though suppression is 
generally correlated with professional success, it is highly susceptible to 
overuse.  For those who became reliant on it, “their lives hurt.”110 
As one lawyer put it:  “All of a sudden you are involved in intellectualizing 
or rationalizing every thought you have, and then you become distanced 
emotionally from your loved ones, your colleagues and even your clients.  
You are distanced from your own feelings, and you kind of lose your 
humanity.”111  And as we have seen, this sense of distancing begins early in 
the first year of law school.  When students enter the liminal space in which 
their familiar guideposts are removed and they await induction into a new 
epistemic order, they may be beset with anxiety.  The problem is not the 
anxiety itself112 but the coping mechanisms available to deal with it.  John 
Mixon and Robert Shuwerk found that “[s]tudents try to deaden the psychic 
pain . . . by using ‘anxiety-muting defenses’ in ever broadening areas of their 
lives to ‘block emotional awareness.’”113  Additionally,  
“[m]any law students will progressively surround themselves with a suit of 
psychological armor that makes them more and more impervious [not only 
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to the immediate stresses of the classroom setting but also] to the emotional 
aspects of most, if not all, situations.” 
Perhaps the most profound and far-reaching consequence of this 
adaptation is its significant impairment of character formation, with a 
resultant crippling of a student’s ability to behave in a professionally 
appropriate manner once in practice.114 
These sorts of consequences—burnout, isolation, unacknowledged 
psychic pain, and impaired ethical judgment—are on nobody’s list of desired 
outcomes.  Why, then, would we choose an epistemic approach that cuts 
students and lawyers off from fruitful sources of knowledge and wisdom, 
from the excitement that drew them to the law in the first place and is most 
likely to sustain them, and from the support of others?115  There is a rich 
literature on the development of Langdell’s case method, legal formalism, 
and the implicit rules of the autonomous system of legal thought,116 among 
other sources of insight into the epistemological foundations of law and legal 
pedagogy. 
My contribution to the debate is to suggest that law’s reflexive and deeply 
rooted affective attachment to a particular notion of rationality is a major 
culprit.  Many of the legal system’s concerns about the role of emotion in the 
reasoning process were at one time widely shared by other fields that study 
human behavior.  But in the past several decades, there has been an explosion 
of knowledge about the dynamics of cognition and decision-making, and the 
consensus is that the old reason/emotion split is, quite simply, outmoded.  It 
is a kind of malpractice to hang on to it, and certainly not a choice rooted in 
a rational openness to new information.117  The current account of cognition 
and emotion leads to the conclusion that emotions cannot be excised from 
the reasoning process but should be embraced as a species of knowledge—
one that can be critiqued and educated like any other.  The effort to exclude 
emotion from the legal conversation leads to below-the-radar choices that 
deprive us of valuable information.  It blocks opportunities to evaluate the 
role of emotions in a range of legal contexts and to reform legal institutions 
 
 114. Id. at 95 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Andrew S. Watson, 
Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 
13 (1963)). 
 115. See Calder, supra note 109, at 64 (“Students come through the doors at law school, 
bright, engaged and passionate, and yet for the most part they don’t leave that way.”). 
 116. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF 
HIERARCHY:  A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (2004); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s 
Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the 
Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1589 (2001); Edward Rubin, 
What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609 
(2019). 
 117. Warding off new information to protect a cherished set of beliefs is decidedly an 
emotional exercise (though of course it often flows from other political, economic, and 
practical sources as well).  Elsewhere I have discussed in detail the emotional dynamics of 
loyalty to ideas and refusal to consider new information threatening to those ideas. See, e.g., 
Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions:  The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. 
L.J. 475 (2006).  For the classic article about fear of emotion in the legal realm, see Abrams 
& Keren, supra note 37. 
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in light of the best available knowledge.  And it has contributed to the 
psychological distress of generations of lawyers. 
